Dietrich Bonhoeffer's "Freedom" from ETHICS
1.We must therefore conclude our analysis of the structure of responsible action by speaking of freedom.
We must therefore conclude our analysis of the structure of responsible action by speaking of freedom.2.Responsibility and freedom are corresponding concepts. Factually, though not chronologically, responsibility presupposes freedom and freedom can consist only in responsibility. Responsibility is the freedom which is given only in the obligation to God and to our neighbor.
Responsibility and freedom are corresponding concepts. Factually, though not chronologically, responsibility presupposes freedom and freedom can consist only in responsibility. Responsibility is the freedom which is given only in the obligation to God and to our neighbor.3.
1Responsible men and women act in the freedom of their own selves, without the support of others, of circumstances, or of principles, but with a due consideration for the given human and general conditions and for the relevant questions of principle. 2The proof of their freedom is the fact that nothing can answer for them, nothing can exonerate them, except their own deeds and their own selves. 3It is they themselves who must observe, judge, weigh up, decide and act. 4It is they themselves who must examine the motives, the prospects, the value and the purpose of their actions. 5But neither the purity of the motivation, nor the opportune circumstances, nor the value, nor the significant purpose of an intended undertaking can become the governing law of those actions, a law to which they can withdraw, to which they can appeal as an authority, and by which they can be exculpated and acquitted. 6For in that case they would no longer be truly free. 7The action of the responsible person is performed in the obligation which alone gives freedom and which gives entire freedom, the obligation to God and to our neighbor as they confront us in Jesus Christ. 8At the same time it is performed wholly within the domain of relativity, wholly in the twilight which the historical situation spreads over good and evil; it is performed in the midst of the innumerable perspectives in which every given phenomenon appears. 9It has not to decide simply between right and wrong and between good and evil, but between right and right and between wrong and wrong. 10As Aeschylus said, "right strives with right." 11Precisely in this respect responsible action is a free venture; it is not justified by any law; it is performed without any claim to a valid self-justification, and there¬fore also without any claim to an ultimate valid knowledge of good and evil. 12Good, as what is responsible, is performed in ignorance of good and in the surrender to God of the deed which has become necessary and which is nevertheless, or for that very reason, free; for it is God who sees the heart, who weighs up the deed, and who directs the course of history.4.With this there is disclosed to us a deep secret of history in general. The man or woman who acts in the freedom of their own most personal responsibility is precisely the one who sees his or her action finally committed to the guidance of God. The free deed knows itself in the end as the deed of God; the decision knows itself as guidance; the free venture knows itself as divine necessity. It is in the free abandonment of knowledge of their own good that they perform the good of God. It is only from this last point of view that one can speak of good in historical action. We shall have to take up these considerations again later at the point at which we have left off.
With this there is disclosed to us a deep secret of history in general. The man or woman who acts in the freedom of their own most personal responsibility is precisely the one who sees his or her action finally committed to the guidance of God. The free deed knows itself in the end as the deed of God; the decision knows itself as guidance; the free venture knows itself as divine necessity. It is in the free abandonment of knowledge of their own good that they perform the good of God. It is only from this last point of view that one can speak of good in historical action. We shall have to take up these considerations again later at the point at which we have left off.5.Before that we still have to give some space to a crucial question which makes an essential contribution to the clarification of our problem. What is the relationship between free responsibility and obedience? It must seem at first sight as though everything we have said about free responsibility is applicable in practice only when one is in what we call a "responsible position" in life, in other words, when one has to make independent decisions on the very largest scale. What connection can there be between responsibility and the monotonous daily work of the laborer, the factory worker, the clerk, the private soldier, the apprentice or the student? It is a different matter already with the owner-farmer, the industrial contractor, the politician or person of state, the general, the skilled supervisor, the teacher and the judge. But in their lives, too, how much there is of technique and duty and how little of really free decision! And so it seems that everything that we have said about responsibility can in the end apply only to a very small group of men and women, and even to these only in a few moments of their lives; and consequently it seems as though for the great majority one must speak not of responsibility but of obedience and duty. This implies one ethic for the great and the strong, for the rulers, and another for the small and the weak, the subordinates; on the one hand responsibility and on the other obedience, on the one hand freedom and on the other subservience. And indeed there can be no doubt that in our modern social order, and especially in the German one, the life of the individual is so exactly defined and regulated, and is at the same time assured of such complete security, that it is granted to only very few to breathe the free air of the wide open spaces of great decisions and to experience the hazard of responsible action which is entirely their own. In consequence of the compulsory regulation of life in accordance with a definite course of training and vocational activity, our lives have come to be relatively free from ethical dangers; individuals who from childhood have had to take their assigned place in accordance with this prin¬ciple are ethically emasculated; they have been robbed of the creative moral power, freedom. In this we see a deep-seated fault in the essential development of our modern social order, a fault which can be countered only with a clear exposition of the fundamental concept of responsibility. As things stand, the large-scale experiential material for the problem of responsibility must be sought for among the great political leaders, industrialists and generals; for indeed those few others who venture to act on their own free responsibility in the midst of the pressure of everyday life are being crushed by the machinery of the social order, by the general routine.
Before that we still have to give some space to a crucial question which makes an essential contribution to the clarification of our problem. What is the relationship between free responsibility and obedience? It must seem at first sight as though everything we have said about free responsibility is applicable in practice only when one is in what we call a "responsible position" in life, in other words, when one has to make independent decisions on the very largest scale. What connection can there be between responsibility and the monotonous daily work of the laborer, the factory worker, the clerk, the private soldier, the apprentice or the student? It is a different matter already with the owner-farmer, the industrial contractor, the politician or person of state, the general, the skilled supervisor, the teacher and the judge. But in their lives, too, how much there is of technique and duty and how little of really free decision! And so it seems that everything that we have said about responsibility can in the end apply only to a very small group of men and women, and even to these only in a few moments of their lives; and consequently it seems as though for the great majority one must speak not of responsibility but of obedience and duty. This implies one ethic for the great and the strong, for the rulers, and another for the small and the weak, the subordinates; on the one hand responsibility and on the other obedience, on the one hand freedom and on the other subservience. And indeed there can be no doubt that in our modern social order, and especially in the German one, the life of the individual is so exactly defined and regulated, and is at the same time assured of such complete security, that it is granted to only very few to breathe the free air of the wide open spaces of great decisions and to experience the hazard of responsible action which is entirely their own. In consequence of the compulsory regulation of life in accordance with a definite course of training and vocational activity, our lives have come to be relatively free from ethical dangers; individuals who from childhood have had to take their assigned place in accordance with this prin¬ciple are ethically emasculated; they have been robbed of the creative moral power, freedom. In this we see a deep-seated fault in the essential development of our modern social order, a fault which can be countered only with a clear exposition of the fundamental concept of responsibility. As things stand, the large-scale experiential material for the problem of responsibility must be sought for among the great political leaders, industrialists and generals; for indeed those few others who venture to act on their own free responsibility in the midst of the pressure of everyday life are being crushed by the machinery of the social order, by the general routine.6.Yet it would be an error if we were to continue to look at the problem from this point of view. There is, in fact, no single life which cannot experience the situation of responsibility; every life can experience this situation in its most characteristic form, that is to say, in the encounter with other people. Even when free responsibility is more or less excluded from one’s vocational and public life, that person nevertheless always stands in a responsible relation to others; these relations extend from family to workmates. The fulfillment of genuine responsibility at this point affords the only sound possibility of extending the sphere of responsibility once more into vocational and public life. Wherever human beings meet one another and this includes the encounters of professional life -- there arises genuine responsibility, and these responsible relationships cannot be supplanted by any general regulation or routine. That holds true, then, not only for the relation between married people, or for parents and children, but also for the supervisor and the apprentice, the teacher and the pupil, the judge and the accused.
Yet it would be an error if we were to continue to look at the problem from this point of view. There is, in fact, no single life which cannot experience the situation of responsibility; every life can experience this situation in its most characteristic form, that is to say, in the encounter with other people. Even when free responsibility is more or less excluded from one’s vocational and public life, that person nevertheless always stands in a responsible relation to others; these relations extend from family to workmates. The fulfillment of genuine responsibility at this point affords the only sound possibility of extending the sphere of responsibility once more into vocational and public life. Wherever human beings meet one another and this includes the encounters of professional life -- there arises genuine responsibility, and these responsible relationships cannot be supplanted by any general regulation or routine. That holds true, then, not only for the relation between married people, or for parents and children, but also for the supervisor and the apprentice, the teacher and the pupil, the judge and the accused.7.But we can go one step further than this. Responsibility does not only stand side by side with relationships of obedience; it has its place also within these relationships. The apprentice has a duty of obedience towards the master, but at the same time has also a free responsibility for his or her work and achievement and, therefore, also for the supervisor. It is the same with the student, and indeed also with the employee in any kind of industrial undertaking and with the soldier in war. Obedience and responsibility are interlinked in such a way that one cannot say that responsibility begins only where obedience leaves off, but rather that obedience is rendered in responsibility. There will always be a relation of obedience and dependence; all that matters is that these should not, as they already largely do today, leave no room for responsibilities. To know one’s self to be responsible is more difficult for the one who is socially dependent than for one who is socially free, but a relationship of dependence does not in any case in itself exclude free responsibility. The employer and the servant, while preserving the relationships of obedience, can and should answer for each other in free responsibility.
But we can go one step further than this. Responsibility does not only stand side by side with relationships of obedience; it has its place also within these relationships. The apprentice has a duty of obedience towards the master, but at the same time has also a free responsibility for his or her work and achievement and, therefore, also for the supervisor. It is the same with the student, and indeed also with the employee in any kind of industrial undertaking and with the soldier in war. Obedience and responsibility are interlinked in such a way that one cannot say that responsibility begins only where obedience leaves off, but rather that obedience is rendered in responsibility. There will always be a relation of obedience and dependence; all that matters is that these should not, as they already largely do today, leave no room for responsibilities. To know one’s self to be responsible is more difficult for the one who is socially dependent than for one who is socially free, but a relationship of dependence does not in any case in itself exclude free responsibility. The employer and the servant, while preserving the relationships of obedience, can and should answer for each other in free responsibility.8.The ultimate reason for this lies in that relation of each person to God which is realized in Jesus Christ. Jesus stands before God as the one who is both obedient and free. As the obedient one he does God's will in blind compliance with the law which is commanded him, and as the free one he acquiesces in God's will out of his own most personal knowledge, with open eyes and a joyous heart; he recreates this will, as it were, out of himself. Obedience without freedom is slavery; freedom without obedience is arbitrary self-will. Obedience restrains freedom; and freedom ennobles obedience. Obedience binds the creature to the Creator, and freedom enables the creature to stand before the Creator as one who is made in the Creator’s image. Obedience shows men and women that they must allow themselves to be told what is good and what God requires of them (Micah 6:8); and liberty enables them to do good themselves. Obedience knows what is good and does it, and freedom dares to act, and abandons to God the judgment of good and evil. Obedience follows blindly and freedom has open eyes. Obedience acts without questioning and freedom asks what is the purpose. Obedience has its hands tied and freedom is creative. In obedience men and women adhere to the decalogue and in freedom they create new decalogues (Luther).
The ultimate reason for this lies in that relation of each person to God which is realized in Jesus Christ. Jesus stands before God as the one who is both obedient and free. As the obedient one he does God's will in blind compliance with the law which is commanded him, and as the free one he acquiesces in God's will out of his own most personal knowledge, with open eyes and a joyous heart; he recreates this will, as it were, out of himself. Obedience without freedom is slavery; freedom without obedience is arbitrary self-will. Obedience restrains freedom; and freedom ennobles obedience. Obedience binds the creature to the Creator, and freedom enables the creature to stand before the Creator as one who is made in the Creator’s image. Obedience shows men and women that they must allow themselves to be told what is good and what God requires of them (Micah 6:8); and liberty enables them to do good themselves. Obedience knows what is good and does it, and freedom dares to act, and abandons to God the judgment of good and evil. Obedience follows blindly and freedom has open eyes. Obedience acts without questioning and freedom asks what is the purpose. Obedience has its hands tied and freedom is creative. In obedience men and women adhere to the decalogue and in freedom they create new decalogues (Luther).9.In responsibility both obedience and freedom are realized. Responsibility implies tension between obedience and freedom. There would be no more responsibility if either were made independent of the other. Responsible action is subject to obligation, and yet it is creative. To make obedience independent of freedom leads only to the Kantian ethic of duty, and to make freedom independent of obedience leads only to the ethic of irresponsible genius. Both the dutiful person and the genius carry their justification within themselves. Responsible people stand between obligation and freedom; they must dare to act under obligation and in freedom; yet they find their justification neither in their obligation nor in their freedom but solely in the One who has put them in this (humanly impossible) situation and who requires this deed of them. Responsible people deliver up themselves and their deeds to God.
In responsibility both obedience and freedom are realized. Responsibility implies tension between obedience and freedom. There would be no more responsibility if either were made independent of the other. Responsible action is subject to obligation, and yet it is creative. To make obedience independent of freedom leads only to the Kantian ethic of duty, and to make freedom independent of obedience leads only to the ethic of irresponsible genius. Both the dutiful person and the genius carry their justification within themselves. Responsible people stand between obligation and freedom; they must dare to act under obligation and in freedom; yet they find their justification neither in their obligation nor in their freedom but solely in the One who has put them in this (humanly impossible) situation and who requires this deed of them. Responsible people deliver up themselves and their deeds to God.10.We have tried to define the structure of responsible life in terms of deputyship, correspondence with reality, acceptance of guilt, and freedom. Now the demand for a more concrete formulation brings us to the question whether it is possible to advance a more exact definition of the place, the locus, at which responsible life is realized. Does responsibility set me in an unlimited field of activity? Or does it confine me strictly within the limits which are implied in my daily concrete tasks? What must I know myself to be responsible for? And what does not lie within the scope of my responsibility? Is there any purpose in regarding myself as responsible for everything that takes place in the world? Or can I stand by and watch these great events as an unconcerned spectator so long as my own tiny domain is in order? Am I to wear myself out in impotent zeal against all the wrong and all the misery that is in the world? Or am I entitled, in self-satisfied security, to let the wicked world run it course, so long as I cannot myself do anything to change it and so long as I have done my own work? What is the place and what are the limits of my responsibility?
We have tried to define the structure of responsible life in terms of deputyship, correspondence with reality, acceptance of guilt, and freedom. Now the demand for a more concrete formulation brings us to the question whether it is possible to advance a more exact definition of the place, the locus, at which responsible life is realized. Does responsibility set me in an unlimited field of activity? Or does it confine me strictly within the limits which are implied in my daily concrete tasks? What must I know myself to be responsible for? And what does not lie within the scope of my responsibility? Is there any purpose in regarding myself as responsible for everything that takes place in the world? Or can I stand by and watch these great events as an unconcerned spectator so long as my own tiny domain is in order? Am I to wear myself out in impotent zeal against all the wrong and all the misery that is in the world? Or am I entitled, in self-satisfied security, to let the wicked world run it course, so long as I cannot myself do anything to change it and so long as I have done my own work? What is the place and what are the limits of my responsibility?Adapted from Ethics, the Macmillan Company, New York, 1955
